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INTRODUCTION

In 1980, 1,820,000 children were living with unmarried parents
in the United States. 1 In just five years the number doubled. By
1985, 3,756,000 children under the age of eighteen were living
with a never-married parent. 2 Between 1984 and 1985 there was
an eight percent increase in nonmarital births to women between
the ages of fifteen and forty-four. 3 For the period between 1975
and 1985 almost seventeen percent of all children born in the
United States were the offspring of unwed mothers.4 In fact, by
t Associate Professor of Law, Nova University Law Center. B.A. 1967, Colgate
University; J.D. 1970, Boston College. This Article is based upon a speech given at the
1987 Annual Convention of the National Legal Aid and Defender Association. The speech
was published in 9 CHILDREN'S LEGAL RTS. J. 9 (Winter 1988). The author wishes to thank
Barbara Monahan for her assistance in the research of this article.
1. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 100TH CONG., 1ST SESS., DATA MATERIALS
RELATED TO WELFARE PROGRAMS FOR FAMILIES WITH CHILDREN (Comm. Print 1987).
2.Id.
3. NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS ADVANCE REPORT OF FINAL NATALITY
STATISTICS, 36 MONTHLY VITAL STATISTICS REPORTS, No.4 (Supp. July 17, 1987). The
specific increase was from 770,355 to 828,174. This increase is the largest since 1980.
4. For a description of the statistics during the mid-1970's, see Caban v. Mohammed,
441 U.S. 380, 402 n.2 (1979).
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1984, twenty-one percent of all mothers giving birth to children
in the United States were unwed. 5 The social and legal
ramifications of such a substantial population of children born
out-of-wedlock are significant. These statistics explain why cases
involving issues of illegitimacy have been decided by the United
States Supreme Court ten times during the period between 1975
and 1985.6
Putative fathers,7 natural mothers, and nonmarital8 children
have sought review in the Supreme Court raising issues of
illegitimacy. The litigation, although disparate in factual context,
may be divided into three categories. The case categories include
constitutional challenges by putative fathers to dependency,
adoption, and paternity proceedings, claims by nonmarital children
5. NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS DATA, ADVANCE REpORTS OF FINAL
NATALITY STATISTICS. 37 MONTHLY VITAL STATTSTICS REpORTS, No.3 (Supp. June 12, 1987).
This number was up from 21 percent in 1984. See BUREAU OF CENSUS, DEp'T OF COMMERCE.
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES (1987).
6. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1 (1983); Mills
v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 (1982); United States v. Clark, 445 U.S. 23 (1980); Califano v.
Boles, 443 U.S. 282 (1979); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Lalli v. Lalli. 439
U.S. 259 (1978); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); Trimble v. Gordon. 430 U.S. 762
(1977); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976).
An additional three cases were decided between 1968 and 1!Yl4. Jimenez v. Weinberger,
417 U.S. 628 (1974); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.s. 535 (1973); Stanley v. illinois. 405 U.S. 645
(1972). The number of decisions during the entire period is even higher when one includes
cases in which illegitimacy was of only factual significance or in which an illegitimacy
issue was raised but not decided. These cases include New Jersey Welfare Rights Org.
v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1!Yl3) (welfare benefits); Weber v. Aetna Casualty and Sur. Co.,
406 U.S. 164 (1972) (worker's compensation); Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971)
!intestacy); Glona v. American Guar. and Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968) (wrongful
death); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (wrongful death); Beaty v. Weinberger, 478
F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1973), afj'd, 418 U.S. 901 (1974); Griffin v. Richardson, 346 F. Supp.
1226 (Md.), afj'd, 409 U.S. 1069 (1972) (social security benefits); and Davis v. Richardson,
342 F. Supp. 588 (Conn.), afj'd, 409 U.S. 1069 (1972). For a detailed analysis of these cases
and United States Supreme Court cases through 1980, see Kellett, The Burger Decade:
More Than Toothless Scrutiny for Laws Affecting illegitimates, 57 DET. J. OF URB. L. 791
(1980); Martin, Legal Rights of the Unwed Father, 102 MIL. L. REV. 67 (1983); Stenger,
Expanding Constitutional Rights of illegitimate Children, 1968-1980, 19 J. FAM. L. 407
(1981); and for an analysis of pre-1968 cases see Krause, Equal Protection for the illegitimate, 65 MICH. L. REV. 477 (1967), and Martin, Legal Rights of the illegitimate Child. 102
MIL. L. REv. 67 (1983).
7. The term "putative father" is synonymous with the term "unwed father" and is
defined as "[tJhe alleged or reputed father of an illegitimate child." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1113 (5th ed. 1979).
8. The term "nonmarital children" is used in this Article because of the recently
recognized pejorative connotation of the word "illegitimate." For a discussion of this
issue, see Bodenheimer, New Trends and Requirements in Adopti.on Laws and Proposals
for Legislative Change, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 10,53 n.228 (1975) and Note, The Unwed Father
and the Right to Krww of His Child's Existence, 76 Ky. L.J. 949, 949 n.2 (1987 -88),
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to the estates of their putative fathers, and support actions
involving both public benefits and child support. All claims have
been based upon alleged denials of due process and equal
protection. The Court has responded by recognizing the application
of procedural and substantive due process and equal protection
principles to these claims.
In the due process context, the Court's opinions demonstrate
that freedom of personal choice in matters of family life is a
liberty interest protected by the procedural due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. This protection extends to families
in which the parents are not married but have children. With
respect to substantive due process, the Court has said that
parents and children have a liberty interest in the family unit
even if the parents are not married. The Court will balance the
interest of the members of the family against the interests of
the state when deciding whether state policy or law may be
imposed upon members of the family and if so, to what extent.
In addressing equal protection claims, the Court has held that
discrimination on the basis of illegitimacy is impermissible if the
governmental purpose is to punish the child for the parents'
failure to conduct themselves in accordance with society's laws
and moral rules. The state must have some other substantial
reason if it wishes to treat nonmarital children differently than
marital children.9
Challenges by nonmarital children have been relatively
successful before the Supreme Court. This success is particularly
evident in comparison to the outcome of cases in which children
are in conflict with their parents or the government and the
issue is something other than the child's legitimacy status.10 In
such contexts as juvenile crime, mental health, abuse and neglect,
and education, the Court has tended to favor the state. The Court
has deferred to the judgment of state officials in cases involving
conflicts between the child and the state or between the parent
and the state.H When the dispute is between parent and child,
9. This Article supports the position that the Court's equal protection analyses have
been fairly consistent. For a different view see Comment, Adoption and the Putative
Father's Rights: Shoecraft v. Catholic Social Services Bureau, 13 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV.
231, 232 (1988).

10. Cf. Note, Children's Rights Under The Burger Court: Concern For The Child But
Defim:nce To Authority, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1214 (1985) [hereinafter Children's Rights].
11. Dale, The Burger Court and Children's Rights-A Trend Toward Retribution? 8
CHILDREN'S LEGAL RTS. J. 7 (19871; Stern, The Burger Court and the Diminishing Constitutional Right.$ of Minors: A Brief Overview, 1985 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 865 (1985); Children's
Rights, supra note 10.
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the Court usually has sided with the parent. 12 However, in
nonmarital status cases, a more equal balance has been struck
among children, parents, and the state.
This Article analyzes the Supreme Court opinions over the
past twenty years in the area of nonmarital status with particular
attention to the subjects of dependency, adoption, paternity,
inheritance, and financial assistance and government benefits for
nonmarital children. The Article describes the sometimes
inconsistent Supreme Court application of procedural due process,
substantive due process, and equal protection concepts, which
nonetheless generally strikes a proper balance among the interests
of nonmarital children, the state, and other parties to these
proceedings. The Article demonstrates that the Court often
obliterates any equal protection distinctions unrelated to
substantial government interests. Although the Court applies
both procedural and substantive due process protections when
constitutionally and pragmatically appropriate, in the area of
government benefits, a level of tension exists with respect to
equal protection. This tension is based in part upon differences
in the Justices' interpretations of legislative history and their
divergent societal value judgments. Because statutory construction
may be the battleground in the fight of nonmarital children for
equal treatment, the outcome remains unpredictable.
Finally, the Article suggests an explanation for the somewhat
better treatment of nonmarital children than children generally
in their cases before the Supreme Court over the past twenty
years. Nonmarital children have been more successful because
their claims generally do not challenge directly either the family
or the government. For example, in the field of education, children
have challenged the authority of the school system;13 in the
delinquency area, children have challenged the authority of the
court;14 and in the mental health commitment area, children have
12. Cf. Parham v. J.R .• 442 U.S. 584 (1979); but see Rivera v. Minnich. 107 S. Ct. 3001
(1987).
13. See. e.g.• Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier. 108 S. Ct. 562 (1988); Bethel School
Dist. v. Fraser. 478 U.S. 675 (1986); New Jersey v. T.L.O .• 469 U.S. 325 (1985); Ingraham
v. Wright. 430 U.S. 651 (1977); Goss v. Lopez. 419 U.s. 565 (1975); Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
14. See. e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687 (1988); Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S.
253 (1984); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979); Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S. 204 (1978);
Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania. 403 U.S. 520 (1971); In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); In re Gault. 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Kent v. United States, 383
U.S. 541 (1966); High v. Kemp, 819 F.2d 988 (1987), cert. granted sub nom. High v. Zant,
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challenged the authority of their parents.15 Although the Court
has been unwilling to favor the rights of children over these
various types of authority, in the nonmarital status area no such
threat to authority exists. To the contrary, the outcome in many
of the cases may be viewed as beneficial to the state. For
example, nonmarital children who gain an entitlement to a putative
father's estate are less likely to be in need of government services
in the form of public assistance. However, the challenges to
government benefits have been more difficult cases for the
nonmarital child to win, specifically because the suits have involved
direct challenges to governmental authority and governmental
purse strings.
I.

DEPENDENCY, ADOPTION, AND PATERNITY

The family integrity cases concern putative fathers who either
were denied the right to participate in or challenge proceedings
involving the legal status of their nonmarital children or who
sought to disclaim responsibility for the children. The more recent
claims are based upon the 1972 decision in Stanley v. Rlinois,l6
in which the Supreme Court ruled that in a dependency
proceeding, it is unconstitutional to presume that an unwed father
is unfitP
In a victory for both the father and the children, the Supreme
Court decided that the father's interest in the "companionship,
care, custody, and management" of his children is recognized as
both a due process and equal protection right. Is The due process
right was procedural in nature, arising from the failure of the
Illinois Juvenile Court Act to provide any notice or hearing rights
to the father. 19 The equal protection claim arose from the Act's
provisions, which defined "parents" as including mothers of
nonmarital children but excluding fathers of nonmarital children.20
108 S. Ct. 2896 (1988); Wilkens v. Missouri, 736 S.W.2d 409 (1987), cert. granted, 108 S.
Ct. 2896 (1988).
15. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
16. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
17. Stanley v. Dlinois, 405 U.S. at 649. When the unwed mother died, the state
deelared the children to be wards of the state and removed them from Stanley's custody
without any hearing or determination that he was an unfit parent. Mr. Stanley lived
with all three ehildren over a period of 18 years and yet, was provided with no opportunity
to challenge the state's action. Id. at 646.
18. Id. at 651.
19. Id. at 658.
20. Id. at 650. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37 (1967).
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The Court further held that the children could not be taken away
from the father in the absence of a hearing and a determination
that the father was unfit.21 It is not clear from Justice White's
majority opinion whether the Court based its holding on due
process or equal protection grounds or some combination of the
two. One explanation for the Court's decision may be that Stanley
appealed to the Supreme Court solely on equal protection
grounds. 22 Irrespective of the specific constitutional basis, Stanley
is a very important case because for the first time the Supreme
Court held that the concept of family integrity may be
constitutionally protected beyond the traditional nuclear family.23
However, the expected shock waves from this expansion of the
concept of the family were not felt immediately.
Although Stanley dealt with both procedural due process and
equal protection issues involving nonmarital children, the case
arose as a dependency proceeding. The questions left unanswered
by Stanley were whether procedural due process, substantive
due process, and equal protection concepts may be applied to an
unwed father in an adoption situation and, if so, to what extent.
The Supreme Court first addressed these issues in Quilloin v.
Walcott. 24 At issue in Quilloin was a putative father's challenge
to Georgia's adoption law on both procedural due process and
equal protection grounds. Quilloin sought to stop the adoption of
his nonmarital child even though the child's mother had custody
and control of the child for his entire life and Quilloin and the
mother had never married nor established a home together.25
Approximately two years after the child was born, the mother
married another man. When the mother consented to the adoption
of the child by her husband, Quilloin attempted to block the
21. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 658. The finding of unfitness refers to a dependency adjudi·
cation on parental qualifications, similar to that which occurs in situations in which the
father and mother of the child had been married. Id.
22. Id. at 647. For a discussion of the lack of specificity in the opinion see Note, The
Impact of Stanley v. illinois on Custody Proceedings for illegitimate Children: Procedural
Parity for the Putative Father? 3 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 31, 36 (1973); Comment,
A Dependency Hearing Which Would Deny an Unwed Father Custody of His Child on the
Death of Its Mother Without Reference to the Father's Fitness as a Parent is Violative of
Due Process and Equal Protection, 4 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 176, 181 (1973); and Comment,
Delineation of the Boundaries of Putative Fathers' Rights: A Psychological Parenthood
Perspective, 15 SETON HALL L. REV. 290,300-01 (1985).
23. The pre·Stanley cases dealt with traditional nuclear families. &e, e.g., Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
24. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
25. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. at 247.
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adoption and secure visitation rights.26 The Georgia statute
provided that in order to be afforded the same right that divorced
or separated parents have to object to a proposed adoption, the
father of a child born out-of-wedlock was obligated to legitimate
the child by either marrying the mother and acknowledging that
the child was his or by obtaining a court order declaring the
child legitimate and capable of inheriting from the father.Zl Quilloin
had done neither of these things. In Georgia, until either action
occurred, courts recognized only the mother as the child's parent.28
Justice Marshall applied both due process and equal protection
analyses in Quilloin.29 He concluded that the father's substantive
due process rights were not violated by the application of a "best
interests of the child" standard in determining whether the father
should be allowed to legitimate the child or whether the adoption
should go forward. 30 Such a test was appropriate because Quilloin
had never sought custody of his child.31 This holding seems to
balance the unwed father's interests in his family against the
state's interest in giving full protection to an already existing
family unit. 32 However, the Court was somewhat reticent in its
holding. As the Court noted, "[w]hatever might be required in
other situations, we cannot say that the State was required in
26. ld.
27. ld. at 249. One Georgia statute provided: "If the child be illegitimate, the consent
of the mother alone shall suffice. Such consent, however, shall not be required if the

mother has surrendered all of her rights to said child to a licensed child-placing agency,
or to the State Department of Family and Children Services." ld. (quoting GA. CODE ANN.
S 74-403(3) (1975)).
The other relevant statute provided:
A father of an illegitimate child may render the same legitimate by petitioning the superior court of the county of his residence, setting forth the
name, age, and sex of such child, and also the name of the mother; and if
he desires the name changed, stating the new name, and praying the
legitimation of such child. Of this application the mother, if alive, shall have
notice. Upon such application, presented and rued, the court may pass an
order declaring said child to be legitimate, and capable of inheriting from
the father in the same manner as if born in lawful wedlock, and the name
by which he or she shall be known.
!d. (quoting GA. CODE ANN. S 74-103 (1975)).
28. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 249.
29. Id. at 254-56. Although Quilloin did not raise the issue, the Court found that he
had received adequate procedural due process when he was given an opportunity to be
heard on his legitimation petition under Georgia law. ld. at 253-54.
30. !d. at 255.
31. Id. Quilloin did have a relationship with his son. He often visited with the child
and gave him gifts "from time to time." ld. at 251.
32. !d. at 254-55.
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this situation to find anything more than that the adoption, and
denial of legitimation, were in the 'best interests of the child.' "33
Quilloin is also important for what the Court did not decide.
In his equal protection challenge, Quilloin only raised the issue
of the distinction between the rights of married fathers and
unmarried fathers. Thus, the Court did not rule on differences
between mothers of nonmarital children and fathers of nonmarital
children.34 The Court distinguished Quilloin's interests from those
of the separated or divorced father, finding that Quilloin had not
accepted the day-to-day parental responsibilities imposed upon
the divorced or separated father and that this distinction allowed
for a difference in the protection provided by the state's adoption
law.35
The Quilloin case demonstrates that to challenge an adoption,
the putative father must make a specific and timely effort to
legitimate the child by marrying the child's mother, obtaining a
court order, or otherwise complying with state law. In other
words, the father must have undertaken some affirmative act.
Just what steps one must take to establish a protectible interest
remained open to question. Two subsequent cases, Caban v.
Mohammed36 and Lehr v. Robertson,37 also dealt with putative
fathers' challenges to the adoption of their children. However,
Caban was an equal protection challenge and thus did not deal
with the standards a putative father must meet to challenge an
adoption. On the other hand, Lehr was a particularly unsuccessful
effort by the Court to address the issue of such standards.
Caban v. Mohammed is similar to Quilloin as it also involved
a father's challenge to the adoption of his two children by their
stepfather without Caban's consent. However, unlike Quilloin,
Caban involved a sex-based equal protection challenge. Justice
Powell, ruling that the New York statute impermissibly
distinguished between the rights of unmarried mothers and
unmarried fathers, applied what often is referred to as the
intermediate equal protection test. He found no substantially
related important state interest to allow for the discrimination.as
33. fd. at 255.
34. fd. at 253 n.13.
35. fd. at 256.
36. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
37. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
38. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. at 394. Abdiel Caban and Maria Mohammed lived
together in New York City between 1968 and 1973 although they were never married.
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The New York statute challenged in Caban allowed the mother
to consent to the adoption without the consent of the father
unless the father could show that the adoption was not in the
children's best interest; however, the mother's consent was
required if the father brought the adoption proceedings. 39
According to the Supreme Court, this gender-based distinction
has to "serve some important governmental objectives" and must
be "substantially related" to the achievement of such purpose or
an equal protection violation would result.. 4O The Court rejected
the claim that this kind of gender distinction "is required by any
universal difference between maternal and paternal relations at
every phase of a child's development."41 The Court also did not
hold that the distinction between unmarried mothers and
unmarried fathers bore a substantial relation to a state interest
in providing adoptive nomes for nonmarital children. It found no
difference in the degree to which unwed fathers would object to
adoption as opposed to unwed mothers. Thus:
The effect of New York's classification was to discriminate
against unwed fathers even when their identity is known and
they have manifested a significant paternal interest in the
child. The facts of this case illustrate the harshness of classifying unwed fathers as being invariably less qualified and

ld. at 382. In fact. until 1974. although separated. Caban was married to another woman.
During the time Caban and Mohammed were living together. they had two children.
Caban was identified as the father on each birth certificate. and he lived with and
supported the children until late 1973. In December 1973. Mohammed left Caban. taking
the two children. and in January 1974. married another man. After the marriage. Caban
continued to see his children. ld. at 382. At one point. Caban took custody of the children.
resulting in the commencement of a custody proceeding by Mohammed in which she was
successful. Thereafter. she and Mr. Mohammed filed a petition seeking to allow her new
husband to adopt the children. Caban cross-petitioned for adoption. The New York
Surrogate Court granted the Mohammeds' petition for adoption and cut off all Mr. Caban's
rights and obligations after it found that his consent to the adoption was not necessary.
ld. at 383-84.
39. Section 111 of the N.Y. DaM. REL. LAW (McKinney 1977) provided that consent by
a parent to an adoption is unnecessary in cases in which the parent abandoned the child,
relinquished parental rights. or suffered termination of parental rights. Unless the mother
fell into such a category. she could not only contest adoption but actually block it by
withholding consent. ld. at 385-86.
40. ld. at 388. The Court's language is taken from Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 19799 (1976), which applied the intermediate standard of review for gender-based discrimination. For a criticism of the application of this standard in Cahan. see Weinhaus,
Substa.ntil'e Rights of the Unwed Father: The B&Undari.es Are Defined, 19 J. FAM. L. 445
(1980-81).
41. Cahan, 441 U.S. at 389.
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entitled than mothers to exercise a concerned judgment as
to the fate of their children.42

In essence, the Court could find no countervailing governmental
interest of any kind in Caban. It did recognize that there might
be situations in which the state could deny a father veto power
over the adoption oi his child when the father had never taken
part in raising his child.43 However, in Caban the Court found
that the "undifferentiated distinction between unwed mothers
and unwed fathers, applicable in all circumstances where adoption
of a child of theirs is at issue, [did] not bear a substantial
relationship to the State's asserted interests."44 Thus, the New
York statute violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment.45
In contrast, Justice Stewart's dissent found the distinction
between unmarried fathers and unmarried mothers under New
York law insufficient to constitute an equal protection violation. 46
There is a certain pragmatic logic in Justice Stewart's dissent.
Under New York law, fathers who have custody of children, even
when the child is illegitimate, are given a veto power over
adoptions.47 Why should the unwed father who does not have
custody of the child and who has not legitimated the child by
marrying the mother have the right to veto the child's adoption?
New York law provides that an unwed father has the right to
challenge the adoption on the merits and show that the adoption
is not in the child's best interests.48 In Stewart's view, this right
is an acceptable accommodation of the competing interests of the
42. Id. at 394. The dissent argued forcefully that the "best interests of the child"
standard in this kind of a family situation is not unconstitutionally discriminatory because
the standard represents a careful effort by the state to balance competing interests and
to promote the welfare of children. Id. at 395 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 392.
44. Id. at 394.
45. Id. As in Quilloin, the appellant made no procedural due process claim because
Caban received notice and an opportunity to participate as a party in the underlying
adoption proceeding. Id. at 385 n.3. However, citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972),
Caban did make a substantive due process claim, arguing that the termination of parental
rights occurred without first finding the father unfit. Id. at 394 n.16. Because the Court
ruled in his favor on the equal protection claim, it did not reach Caban's substantive due
process claim. Id. Caban also made a second equal protection claim, asserting that New
York impermissibly discriminated between married and unmarried fathers. The Court
elected not to address this issue as well. Id.
46. Id. at 398-401 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 395 (citing N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW S l11(l)(d) (McKinney 1977)).
48. Id.
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parents, state, and child and thus does not violate the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 49 Under the
majority's interpretation, this system for challenging adoption is
constitutionally inadequate.
A much more difficult question was presented to the Court in
Lehr v. Robertson.50 The issue in Lehr was whether an unmarried
father who had never supported and had never seen his child
since her birth two years earlier had an absolute right under the
due process clause to notice and an opportunity to be heard
before the child was adopted. 51 In Lehr the child's unmarried
mother subsequently married a man who sought to adopt the
child. Under New York law, notice of adoption proceedings had
to be given to certain classes of fathers of children born out of
wedlock including
those who have been identified as the father on the child's
birth certificate, those who live openly with the child and the
child's mother and who hold themselves out to be the father,
those who have been identified as the father by the mother
in a sworn written statement, and those who were married
to the child's mother before the child was six months old.52

Additionally, an unwed father could enter his name in New York's
putative father registry.53 Lehr neither registered nor complied
with the statute. In order to block the adoption, he commenced
a proceeding in a New York state court to challenge the statute.54

49. !d. at 395-96.
50. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
51. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. at 249-50. At first glance, Lehr appears similar to
the situation referred to by Justice Powell in Caban in which a natural father is not
eligible for application of the equal protection clause. Caban, 441 U.S. at 392. However,
Lehr was not decided on equal protection grounds but on due process grounds. Lehr had
originally made a gender-based equal protection claim, arguing that the New York law
which denied fathers of nonmarital children the right to veto adoption while granting
mothers such a right violated the equal protection clause. Id. at 255. But while Lehr was
pending in the lower New York courts, Caban was decided. The dissenters in Caban
specifically stated that the holding would not be retroactive because of the thousands of
adoption cases which would be affected by such a result. Caban, 441 U.S. at 415-16.
Instead Lehr's position was governed by In re Malpica-Orsini, 36 N.Y.2d 568, 331 N.E.2d
486 (1975), the case which Caban overruled. Thus, the equal protection claim was not
before the Supreme Court in Lehr.
52. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 251.
53. Id. at 250-51 n.4 (citing N.Y. Soc. SERVo LAW S 372-<: (McKinney Supp. 198283)).
54. Id. at 253. A month after the adoption proceeding commenced in Ulster County,
New York, Lehr brought a visitation and paternity proceeding in family court in Westch-
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In the United States Supreme Court, Lehr mounted a two-part
challenge to the New York statutory scheme. First, Lehr argued
that his relationship with the child constituted a liberty interest
which could not be destroyed without due process of law. 55
Second, he challenged the state's gender-based classification on
the ground that he was denied equal protection because he
received fewer procedural rights than the natural mother.56
Relying upon Stanley, Quilloin, and Caban, the Court held that
"the mere existence of a biological link does not merit equivalent
constitutional protection."57 The Court found that an unwed father
should demonstrate a full commitment to the responsibilities of
parenthood by participating in the rearing of the child and by
showing a personal interest in the child. In so doing, he would
gain protection under the fourteenth amendment due process
clause.58 The Court concluded that New York's statutory scheme
provided the putative father with adequate methods of protecting
himself against the adoption of his child.59 In addressing the key
issue of notice, the Court ruled that the Constitution did not
require the judge or adverse litigant to give special notice to a
nonparty who is "presumptively capable of asserting and
protecting [his] own rights."60
The Court also rejected Lehr's equal protection claim, finding
no violation because Lehr had never established a relationship
with his child. The Court allowed the mother and father in Lehr
ester County. New York. Lehr served the mother's lawyer and advised the court hearing
the adoption of the paternity proceeding he had brought in the family court in Westchester
County. ld. at 252. The court hearing the adoption stayed the out-of-county paternity
proceeding until it could rule on a motion to change the venue of that proceeding to
Ulster county. ld. at 252-53. A few days later. when Lehr's attorney called the judge
hearing the adoption proceeding to advise the judge of his plan to seek a stay of the
adoption. the judge informed the lawyer that he had signed the adoption order earlier
that day. ld. at 253. Incredibly. the judge stated that he had known of the pending
paternity petition but did not believe that he was required to give notice. Lehr lost in
the New York courts despite the obvious unfairness of these events. See In re Jessica
XX, 54 N.Y.2d 417. 430 N.E.2d 896, 446 N.Y.S.2d 20 (1981).
55. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 255.
56. ld.
57. ld. at 261.
58. ld. The distinction between unmarried fathers who have established a bond with
their nonmarital children and those who have not has been described as the distinction
between "developed" relationships as in Stanley and Cahan and "potential" relationships
as in Quilloin. Doskow, Tlu3 Constitution, Notice, and the Sins oj the Fathers. 8 J. Juv. L.
12, 14 (1984).
59. Lehr. 463 U.S. at 262-63 nn.18-19.
60. ld. at 265.
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to be treated differently because there was a substantial
relationship between the disparate treatment and the state's
important purpose of promoting the best interests of the child.61
This purpose prevails when the father has not established a
substantial relationship with the child and thus is not in a similar
position to the mother.62
The dissenting Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun would
have found that the putative father was nonetheless entitled to
procedural due process protections in the form of notice and
opportunity to be heard.63 They believed that the nature of the
interest at stake, the interest of a natural parent in his or her
child, gives rise to due process protections. The dissenters rejected
the majority's position that the parental relationship mayor may
not be a protected interest depending on the particular facts of
the case.64 Specifically, they rejected the majority view that the
biological relationship alone does not give rise to an interest
which is protected by procedural due process.65 Rather, the
dissenters viewed the biological relationship as an interest which
gives rise to due process protections; "how well developed that
relationship has become goes to its 'weight' not its 'nature.' "66
Finally, because the dissenters found a violation of due process,
they did not reach the equal protection argument.67
Lehr demonstrates that a putative father's due process and
equal protection challenges will not succeed when the father has
made no effort to legitimate his child prior to the adoption. The
states can and indeed have drafted statutes that set out objective
understandable tests which the putative father must meet to
have standing to contest an adoption.6s The New York statute in
61. [d. at 266.
62. [d. at 267 -68.
63. [d. at 268, 276 (White, J., dissenting).
64. [d. at 269-70.
65. [d. at 271-73. The Supreme Court's two-step due process analysis has been
repeated in numerous contexts. The Court first decides whether due process applies by
determining whether a liberty or property interest is implicated, and if so, what process
is due. See Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 601-02 (1973); Board of Regents v. Roth,
408 U.S. 564, 570-72 (1972).
66. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 272.
67. [d. at 276.
68. See Shoe craft v. Catholic Social Servo Bureau, 222 Neb. 574, 385 N.W.2d 448 (1986);
see also Note, Ne1:traska's Five-Day Statute of Limitations far Unwed Fathers, 67 NEB. L.
REV. 408 (1988) (suggesting that the Nebraska statute may not pass constitutional muster)
[hereinafter Fit'e-Day Statute]. For additional analyses, see Comment, Domestic Relations
-Parental Rights of the Putative Father: Equal Protecticn and Due Process Considerations,

Published by Reading Room, 1989

HeinOnline -- 5 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 535 1988-1989

13

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [1989], Art. 1

536

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol.5:523

Lehr provides a good example of a standard against which the
courts should have no difficulty evaluating the father's efforts.69
The Lehr standard is also beneficial to the nonmarital child
because it requires the father to have some substantial
involvement with the child in order to contest the adoption. Legal
authority as well as social morality suggest that such lack of
contact is contrary to the child's best interests.70 A comparison
of the relationships between the fathers and children in Caban
and Lehr supports this conclusion. In Caban, the father, mother,
and two children lived together as a natural family for several
years, and the father participated in the care and support of his
children.71 This situation did not exist in Lehr because the putative
father, whose paternity the mother denied at all times, had no

14 MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 259 (1984) [hereinafter Domestic Relations]; Riesenburger, Paternity:
Status of the Law in Flmida, 62 FLA. BAR J. 61 (Nov. 1988); and Comment, The Unwed
Father and Adoption in Utah: A Proposal for Statutory Reform, 1989 Utah L. Rev. 115.
69. The New York statute considered in Lehr provided:
Persons entitled to notice, pursuant to subdivision one of this section, shall
include:
(a) any person adjudicated by a court in this state to be the father of
the child;
(b) any person adjudicated by a court of another state or territory of
the United States to be the father of the child, when a certified copy of the
court order has been filed with the putative father registry, pursuant to
section three hundred seventy-two-c of the social services law;
(c) any person who has timely filed an unrevoked notice of intent to
claim paternity of the child, pursuant to section three hundred seventy-two
of the social services law;
(d) any person who is recorded on the child's birth certificate as the
child's father;
(e) any person who is openly living with the child and the child's mother
at the time the proceeding is initiated and who is holding himself out to be
the child's father;
(f) any person who has been identified as the child's father by the mother
in written, sworn statement; and
(g) any person who was married to the child's mother within six months
subsequent to the birth of the child and prior to the execution of a surrender
instrument or the initiation of a proceeding pursuant to section three hundred
eighty-four-b of the social services law.
Lehr, 463 U.S. at 251-52 (quoting N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw SS 111-a(2), (3) (McKinney 1977
& Supp. 1982-83)}.
70. See, e.g., Lehr, 463 U.S. 261-62 n.17; Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. at 405
(Stevens, J., dissenting); M. LAMB, THE ROLE OF THE FATHER IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT 437,
479 (1981). The father's involvement prior to the birth of the child may also be significant.
See Five-Day Statute, supra note 68, at 420; Domestic Relations, .mpra note 68, at 26667; Buchanan, The Constit1ttional Rights of Unwed Fathers Before and After Lehr v.
Robertson, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 313 (1984).
71. Caban, 441 U.S. at 389.
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contact with the child from birth to the commencement of the
adoption proceeding which the father sought to challenge.72
However, under Lehr, a putative father who is prevented from
establishing a relationship with his child and who, despite his
best efforts, cannot comply with the notice requirements, will
lack standing to challenge his child's adoption. This result may
be viewed as harsh from the vantage point of the putative father,
but as both pragmatic and beneficial from the standpoint of the
child.
The court in In re Baby Girl M.73 recently raised the question
of whether such a harsh result is constitutional. Although the
United States Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of a
properly presented federal question,74 an analysis of the case is
instructive. The mother and father of Baby Girl M. dated, and
when the relationship ended, neither knew that the woman was
pregnant.75 When the child was born, the mother immediately
sought to have her adopted. She never informed the father of
the pregnancy and only informed him of the birth of the child
two weeks after it occurred. At that time, the father attempted
to contact the San Diego Department of Social Services to
determine his rights. 76 However, after the mother relinquished
her rights, the state commenced termination of parental rights
proceedings despite the fact that the father had sought custody
after the child was placed with prospective adoptive parents.77
When the father sought custody of the child, the trial court
held that such placement would not be in the best interests of
the child.78 On appeal, the California Supreme Court remanded,
holding that detriment to the child had to be established before
a best interest standard could be applied.79 The trial court
72. Lehr, 463 u.s. at 250; In re Jessica XX, 54 N.Y.2d 417, 430 N.E.2d 896, 446
N.Y.S.2d 20 (1981). For an analysis of putative fathers' rights under state adoption
statutes through 1985, see Note, Removing the Bar Sinister: Adoption Rights of Putative
Fatlu:rs, 15 CU~tB. L. REV. 499 (1985).
73. In re Baby Girl M., 37 Cal. 3d 65, 688 P.2d 918, 207 Cal. Rptr. 309 (1984).
74. McNamara v. County of San Diego Dep't of Social Serv., 57 U.S.L.W. 4041 (1989)
(No. 87·5840).
75. In re Baby Girl M., 37 Cal. 3d at 68, 688 P.2d at 920, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 311.
76. !d.
77. !d. At the hearing the plaintiff, McNamara, was found to be the biological father.
The subject of child custody involving nonmarital children is beyond the scope of this
article. See Note, Child Custody Law: Custody Presumptions Favoring One Parent May
Impair the Child's Best Interests, 38 U. FLA. L. REV. 187 (1986).
78. See In re Baby Girl M., 236 Cal. Rptr. 660, 661 (1987).
79. lit re Baby Girl Moo 37 Cal. 3d 65, 688 P.2d 918, 207 Cal. Rptr. 309 (1984).
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considered expert testimony and held that granting custody to
the father would be psychologically damaging to the child because
she had grown accustomed to her prospective adoptive parents
who had cared for her since her placement shortly after birth.so
The father appealed this decision to the California Court of
Appeal, asserting that his fitness, rather than the child's detriment,
was the issue, and his fitness was not disputed. The court of
appeal acknowledged the father's interest, but held the interest
of the child superior.81
The putative father in In re Baby Girl M. raised two issues
before the Supreme Court, both based on equal protection
grounds.82 First, he argued that termination of his parental rights
solely on the basis of best interests of the child was a denial of
equal protection when he had shown significant interest in the
child. Second, the father contended that termination of parental
rights without a showing of lack of parental ability was a denial
of equal protection. He argued that the mother of the child was
not treated similarly. It would appear that the Supreme Court
dismissed the appeal because these issues were not raised by
the father in the lower court. In re Baby Girl M. also raised the
unresolved question in Lehr, whether the unwed father and child
have any procedural rights to establish a relationship with each
other when they have thus far been prevented from doing SO.83
Doubtless, this issue will come before the Court again.
The rights of a putative father and his child are again before
the Court in a different context. In Michael H. v. Gerald D.,54 the
issue involves the constitutionality of a California statute which
contains a conclusive presumption, subject to three limited
exceptions, that a child of a married woman who is cohabitating
with her husband is the child of the marriage. 85 The three
exceptions are when the husband is impotent or sterile, or when
the husband alone, or the wife together with the biological father,
petition for a blood test to determine paternity within two years
80. See In re Baby Girl M., 236 Cal. Rptr. at 662.
81. Id. at 665.
82. 57 U.S.L.W. 3030 (1989) (No. 87·5840).
83. For a further discussion of this issue see Shoecraft v. Catholic Social Servo Bureau,
222 Neb. 574 (1986); Comment, Adoption and the Putative Father's Rights: Shoecraft V.
Catholic Social Services Bureau, 13 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 231 (1988); and Five·Day Statute,
supra note 68.
84. 191 Cal. App. 3d 995, 236 Cal. Rptr. 810 (1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1072 (1988).
85. Michael H. V. Gerald D., 191 Cal. App. 3d at 1007-08, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 818; CAL.
EVID. CODE S 621 (West Supp. 1989).

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol5/iss2/1HeinOnline

-- 5 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 538 1988-1989

16

Dale: The Evolving Constitutional Rights of Nonmarital Children: Mixed

1989]

NONMARITAL CHILDREN

539

of the birth of the child.56 Thus, a biological father who is not
married to the mother may be absolutely precluded from
establishing paternity under the California law.
Michael H. involves questions of both equal protection and due
process.87 In this reverse paternity case, the unwed father's equal
protection argument is based on a claim that the irrebuttable
presumption treats the father of a child by a married woman
cohabitating with another man at the time of conception and
birth differently than other parents. Thus, the father in Michael
H. argues that he has been denied the ability to prove that he
is the biological father and so vindicate his parental rights to a
relationship with the child. He claims that this irrebuttable
presumption allows gender-based discrimination. 55 Such
discrimination is prohibited by the Court's holding in Cahan.59
In addition, the unwed father claims that he has a right to a
relationship with his child which may not be terminated by the
state in the absence of due process.90 The Court has been asked
to decide whether there is a fundamental interest in the familial
relationship between the unwed father and child, and if so, what
procedures should be made available to protect that interest.91

86. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 621 (West Supp. 1989), which provides that unless blood
tests show otherwise, "the issue of a wife cohabitating with her husband, who is not
impotent or sterile, is conclusively presumed to be a child of the marriage."
87. Dale, Tlu' Presumption that the Husband Is the Father of His Wife's Child: Should
It be Conclusive? 1988-1989 ABA Previr::w of the United States Supreme Court Cases 41.
Michael H. is also important because it involves the underlying issue of the best interests
of the child. At what point does the forced intervention of a biological but unknown
father overcome the countervailing considerations of what upbringing is best for the
child? Although the answer on a psychological level is imprecise, at some point the
Supreme Court will have to decide this question on a due process or equal protection
basis.
88. Id. at 42.
89. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
90. Id. at 1008-09, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 817.
91. The basic case relied upon in support of the appellant's position is Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
Significantly, the child in Michael H. makes the same claim that the conclusive presumption denies due process rights. Cases used to support the child's argument are
Rivera v. Minnich, 107 S. Ct. 3001, 3004 (1987) and Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 63334 (1979). The California Court of Appeal rejected the child's due process argument in
Michael H., finding that the state's interest outweighed those of the child. Michael H.,
191 Cal. App. 3d at 1010, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 818. Noting the state's interest in preserving
and protecting the developed parent/child relationship, the court found that the welfare
of the child would be harmed if she were permitted to rebut the conclusive presumption
of legitimacy. Id., 236 Cal. Rptr. at 819.
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But what if the putative father does not wish to be recognized
as the parent of an illegitimate child? What are the rights of
parents, child, and state under these circumstances? This issue
arose in a 1987 Supreme Court paternity case, Rivera v. Minnich,92
which demonstrated that the state is also interested in having
the rights of putative fathers adjudicated for purposes of
inheritance and other benefits.
In Rivera, the mother, an unmarried minor, gave birth to a
baby and two weeks later filed a complaint in the Lancaster,
Pennsylvania Common Pleas Court seeking support for her son.93
Because the mother was receiving public assistance, the case was
brought with the assistance of the Pennsylvania authorities, who
based their efforts to obtain support on the Social Security Act
provisions governing aid to families with dependent children.94
At a subsequent paternity proceeding, the putative father, Rivera,
was represented by counsel. At that proceeding, Rivera filed a
motion challenging the burden of proof standard set out in the
Pennsylvania statute.95 He claimed that the standard should be
proof by clear and convincing evidence rather than the state's
standard of preponderance of the evidence.96 Additionally, he
argued that the Pennsylvania statute violated the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment of the United States
Constitution and requested that the jury be charged pursuant to
the clear and convincing evidence standard.97
In an opinion written by Justice Stevens, the Court upheld the
preponderance of the evidence standard against Rivera's due
process challenge.98 The significance of the case lies in the Court's
balancing of the interests of the mother, child, and state. The
Court in Rivera, relying on previous opinions including Santosky
v. Kramer,99 Quilloin v. Walcott,lOO and Mathews v. Eldridge,IOI had
little trouble determining that a fair balance was met by a
92. 107 S. Ct. 3001 (1987).
93. Rivera v. Minnich, 107 S. Ct. at 3002.
94. 42 U.S.C. § 654(4) (1982).
95. Rivera, 107 S. Ct. at 3002.
96. Id. at 3002-03.
97. Id. at 3003.
98. Id. In the majority of states, the standard to be met by the nonmarital child is
preponderance of the evidence; other states such as New York require proof by clear
and convincing evidence. Id.
99. 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
100. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
101. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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preponderance test.102 The majority concluded that to do otherwise
would provide protections to the putative father more extensive
than those available to the other parties and interested entities
when there was no justification for such preferential treatment.103
II.

INHERITANCE

Since 1977 the Supreme Court has decided three cases involving
the standards by which a nonmarital child may inherit from his
father. 104 While holding that nonmarital children may not be
precluded absolutely from seeking to inherit, the Court has
upheld differences in the inheritance standards between marital
and nonmarital children. These cases have turned on an application
of equal protection standards.
The seminal case, Trimble v. Gordon,lo5 involved a challenge to
the constitutionality of the Illinois Probate Act, which provided
that nonmarital children could inherit by intestate succession
from their mothers but not from their putative fathers.I 06 However,
the Illinois law allowed marital children to inherit by intestate
succession from both their mothers and fathers. The appellant in
Trimble was the daughter of a man who had lived with the child's
mother and then died intestate.lo7 Before the man's death, the
Circuit Court of Cook County had entered a paternity order
determining that he was the child's father and ordering him to
pay support. The father did support the child until his death and
left an estate consisting only of a 1976 Plymouth automobile
worth $2500.108 The child's mother brought a probate action to
102. Riwra, 107 S. Ct. at 3004-06.
103. Id. at 3006. Only Justice Brennan dissented from the majority. He concluded that

the putative father's financial interests, the unwanted creation of a life-long cultural and
moral role, and the social stigma involved all gave rise to a significant protected interest.
/d. at 3006-07. Therefore, Justice Brennan concluded that the putative father's liability
and property interests required a more demanding standard of proof. Id. at 3007.
104. Reed v. Campbell, 476 U.S. 852 (1986); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978); Trimble
v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
105. 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
106. Trimble, 430 U.S. at 764-65. Section 2-2 of the illinois Probate Act states:
An illegitimate child is heir of his mother and of any maternal ancestor and
of any person from whom his mother might have inherited, if living; and the
lawful issue of an illegitimate person shall represent such person and take
by descent any estate which the parent would have taken, if living. A child
who was illegitimate whose parent intermarry and who is acknowledged by
the father as the father's child is legitimate.
ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 110 1/2, S 2-2 (Smith-Hurd 1978).
107. Trimble, 430 U.S. at 764.
108. /d.
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recover the automobile, but the illinois courts upheld the probate
statute and ruled that as an illegitimate child, the daughter had
no right to share in her father's estate.
The United States Supreme Court reversed, finding the statute
an unconstitutional violation of the equal protection clause.109 The
crux of the opinion was the finding that the standard for evaluating
this state law was less than strict scrutiny but more than rational
basis.no The Court used this intermediate test to evaluate the
discrimination against the professed purpose of the probate
statute.111
The state made two arguments in support of the statute promotion of family relationships and orderly disposition of
property.ll2 The Court relied upon earlier cases and held that it
was unjust to punish the child for the failure of either of her
parents to conduct themselves in accordance with society at large
and its moral rules. u3 While finding that the state's need to
provide for orderly disposition of property at death was legitimate,
the Court ruled that the particular statute did not accomplish
this purpose in constitutional fashion. ll4 The Court concluded that
although the state had a legitimate interest in protecting against
"spurious claims of paternity," this law impermissibly precluded
the claims of nonmarital children. u5
Within a year, Lalli v. Lalli116 raised the closer and more
difficult question of to what degree the state could treat nonmarital
children differently in terms of intestate succession. In Lalli, the
nonmarital son of Mario Lalli brought an action for a compulsory
109. Id. at 765-66.
110. Id. at 766-67. The Court premised its application of the intermediate equal
protection test on Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co.• 406 U.S. 164. 172 (1972). which
held that at a minimum. such a statutory classification must bear a rational relationship
to a legitimate state interest and on Mathews v. Lucas. 427 U.S. 495 (1976). which held
that such classifications are not suspect and therefore are not tested against a standard
of strict scrutiny. Id. Justice Rehnquist dissented in Trimble. advocating the application
of a rational basis test. Id. at 786.
111. Id. at 766-67.
112. Id. at 768-70.
113. Id. at 770. Despite the Court's failure to overrule explicitly Labine v. Vincent. 401
U.S. 532 (1971). it is hard to reconcile the more recent cases with this earlier decision.
See Trimble. 430 U.s. at 776 n.17. See also W. WEYRAUCH AND S. KATZ. AMERICAN FAMILY
LAW IN TRANSITION 598-602 (1983).
114. Trimble. 430 U.S. at 771-73.
115. Id. at 776.
116. 439 U.S. 259 (1978). For a discussion of this case see Comment. fllegitimates and
Equal Protection: Lalli v. Lalli-A Retreat From Trimble v. Gordon. 57 DEN. U.L.J. 453
(1980).
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accounting of the administration of his father's estate, claiming
that he was entitled to inherit from his father who died intestate.ll7
Although the son had not obtained a filiation order during his
putative father's lifetime as required by New York's probate law,
he argued that there was substantial evidence of his relationship
with his father .118 In support of his position, he submitted a
notarized statement from his father, which consented to the son's
marriage and referred to him as the father's son. The son also
filed several other affidavits which stated that the father often
had said that the appellant was his child.l19
In a plurality opinion, the Court employed the same equal
protection test outlined in Trimble. 120 The Court analyzed the
requirement that the putative father be declared the father in a
paternity proceeding prior to his death. The plurality found the
statute constitutional. because it was related to an important
state interest-the orderly disposition of property at death. 121
The dissenters, however, found the case indistinguishable from
Trimble, arguing that the statute could be redrafted to allow a
nonmarital child to prove the paternity of the father by other
means.122
The Court reaffirmed the Trimble test in the most recent
inheritance case, Reed v. Campbell. l23 In Reed, a nonmarital
daughter attempted to inherit from her putative father by
intervening in an ongoing probate proceeding. The estate
proceeding had been commenced prior to the Trimble decision,
although the daughter's effort to intervene occurred after Trimble.
The Supreme Court simply said that the two dates had no impact
upon the fact that the state statute was constitutionally invalid.124
117. Lalli v. Lalli. 439 U.S. at 261.
118. ld. at 261-62. The probate law stated that:
An illegitimate child is the legitimate child of his father so that he and his
issue inherit from his father if a court of competent jurisdiction has. during
the lifetime of the father. made an order of filiation declaring paternity in
a proceeding instituted during the pregnancy of the mother or within two
years from the birth of the child.
ld. (quoting N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW S 4-1.2(a)(2) (McKinney 1967)).
119. ld. at 262-63.
120. ld. at 264-65.
121. !d. at 268. 275.
122. ld. at 278-79. The dissenters also concluded that the majority's argument that
the New York statute protected the state from claims by unknown nonmarital children
was tenuous at best.
123. 476 U.S. 852 (1986).
124. Reed v. Campbell. 476 U.S. at 856.
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The inheritance cases demonstrate that when the government
is a conduit for the resolution of disputes between private parties
rather than a party to the dispute, the Court will not allow the
government to discriminate between marital and nonmarital
children absent a significant governmental interest. In inheritance
cases, the government may prevail against a nonmarital child by
demonstrating the need for a system of orderly disposition of
property at death. However, the Court has approved statutory
limitations on the rights of a nonmarital child in probate matters
when the putative father has not been declared the child's father
in a paternity proceeding prior to death. Contrary to the
dissenters' argument in Lalli that such a requirement makes it
virtually impossible for a child who has been fully supported by
a putative father to inherit from him,125 the Court seems willing
to allow such a difference in treatment as a legitimate
governmental prerogative. Thus, unless the state statute requires
less, a filiation order may be a prerequisite to a nonmarital child's
right to inherit from the putative father.

III.

FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE

The third subject of Supreme Court rulings involves the rights
of nonmarital children to various sources of child support, both
public and private. As the following analysis demonstrates, the
Court has been more protective of the interests of children when
private child support is involved than when government benefits
are at issue. A series of four cases decided between 1974 and
1980 illustrates the Court's reaction to nonmarital children seeking
public money.126

A. Government Benefits
In Jimenez v. Weinberger,127 the Court addressed the right of
a disabled worker's nonmarital children to Social Security
insurance benefits. At issue in Jimenez was a section of the Social
Security Act which provided that certain nonmarital children
were not entitled to insurance benefits through their disabled
fathers. These children were those whose fathers' paternity could
125. Lalli. 439 U.S. at 278.
126. United States v. Clark, 445 U.S. 23 (1980); Califano v. Boles. 443 U.S. 282 (1979);
Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974).
127. 417 U.S. 628 (1974).
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not be proven through acknowledgement by the father or affirmed
by evidence of domicile and support by the father prior to the
onset of his disability.l28 In Jimenez, the Court rejected an absolute
bar to such benefits for this particular group of nonmarital
children because the Act covered other nonmarital children. l29
The Court held that there was no rational statutory basis upon
which to deny these "after born" children the right to establish
their fathers' paternity.130 The Secretary of the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare attempted to justify the conclusive
exclusion by arguing that the provision prevented spurious
claims.l31 The problem with the Secretary's position was its
failure to recognize that the claims by nonmarital children covered
by the Act could be equally spurious.132 The Court held the
section invalid, finding two sub-classes of nonmarital children,
one conclusively denied benefits and the other presumptively
allowed benefits, and no justification for the distinction. 133
Mathews 1-'. Lucasl34 involved a Social Security Act provision
which related to the eligibility of certain nonmarital children for
survivorship benefits. Despite the holding in Jimenez, the Court
rejected the equal protection challenge of the nonmarital children
in Mathews. A comparison of Jimenez and Mathews demonstrates
the tension in this area and the imprecision in the Court's
analyses.
The statute challenged in Mathews required certain nonmarital
children to prove that the deceased wage earner was their father
and, at the time of his death, was living with and contributing
to their support.135 There was a presumption of dependency for
marital children and for those nonmarital children whose fathers
had acknowledged the children as their offspring, had been
judicially declared the fathers, or had been ordered to support
the children.1OO The Court distinguished Jimenez in rejecting the
128. Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. at 631 n.2.
129. ]d. The Social Security Act provided that nonmarital children who could inherit
under the intestacy laws of their father's domicile and children unable to inherit only
because their parents' ceremonial marriage was invalid for nonobvious defects were
entitled to benefits "without any further shOwing of parental support." Id. See also 42
U.S.C. S 416(h)(3) (1982).
130. Jimenez, 417 U.S. at 636.
131. Id. at 635.
132. Id. at 636.
133. Id. at 637.
134. 427 U.S. 495 (1976).
135. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. at 498 nn.1-2 (citing 42 U.s.C. S 402(d)(1), (3) (1970)).
136. Id. at 498-99.
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equal protection challenge. The Court found that the nonmarital
children in Jimenez had been "conclusively" denied benefits and
justified the denial of benefits in Mathews because it was not
conclusive. l37 The nonmarital children could qualify for the benefits
by proving support and cohabitation at the time of the wage
earner's death. l38 Furthermore, the Court found the difference in
treatment was based upon the legitimate governmental purpose
of requiring that the survivors have been dependent upon the
deceased wage earner .139
Justice Stevens' dissent found Jimenez indistinguishable.140 He
believed that the majority actually did not find the distinction
justified, but rather based its decision on the opinion that a
governmental agency's need for administrative convenience ought
to be accepted as an adequate reason to treat two groups
differently.141 Stevens concluded that administrative convenience
is a pretext for the belief "that illegitimates are less deserving
persons than legitimates."142
The issue of Social Security benefits again came before the
Supreme Court in Califano v. Boles,143 a nationwide class action
in which nonmarital children and their unmarried mothers
challenged Section 202(g)(1) of the Social Security Act.144 In a
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

fd. at 512.
fd.
fd. at 516.
fd. at 516-18.
fd. at 522.
fd. at 523.
443 U.S. 282 (1979).
The statute provides:
(1) The widow and every surviving divorced mother (as defined in section
416(d) of this title) of an individual who died a fully or currently insured
individual, if such widow or surviving divorced mother(A) is not married,
(B) is not entitled to a widow's insurance benefit,
(e) is not entitled to old-age insurance benefits, or is entitled to old-age
insurance benefits each of which is less than three-fourths of the primary
insurance amount of such individual,
(D) has filed application for mother's insurance benefits, or was entitled
to wife's insurance benefits on the basis of the wages and self-employment
income of such individual for the month preceding the month in which he
died,
(E) at the time of filing such application has in her care a child or such
individual entitled to a child's insurance benefit, and
(F) in the case of a surviving divorced mother (i) the child referred to in subparagraph (E) is her son, daughter or
legally adopted child, and
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close decision, the Court ruled that the Act's restriction limiting
mothers' insurance benefits to widows and divorced wives of
wage earners was not a denial of equal protection.145 The majority
concluded that a rational basis existed for distinguishing between
surviving parents who were married and those who were not
married.146 According to the Court, Congress reasonably could
have decided that a woman who had never married the wage
earner was less likely to be dependent on the wage earner at
the time of his death than was the one who was married. 147 In
addition, the Court found that the children's benefits from their
parent's receipt of Social Security benefits were only
"incidental,"148 and the impact of the denial of benefits on the
children was "speculative."149
The dissenters viewed the case as an equal protection challenge
involving nonmarital children rather than unmarried spouses.
They would have found that Congress designed the mothers'
insurance benefits program to aid the children; therefore, the
denial of support to nonmarital children bore no substantial

(iii the benefits referred to in such subparagraph are payable on the
basis of such individual's wages and self-employment income,
shall (subject to subsection (s) of this section) be entitled to a mother's
insurance benefit for each month, beginning with the first month after August
1950 in which she becomes so entitled to such insurance benefits and ending
with the month preceding the first month in which any of the following
occurs: no child of such deceased individual is entitled to a child's insurance
benefit, such widow or surviving divorced mother becomes entitled to an
old·age insurance benefit equal to or exceeding three·fourths of the primary
insurance amount of such deceased individual, she becomes entitled to a
widow's insurance benefit, she remarries, or she dies. Entitlement to such
benefits shall also end, in the case of a surviving divorced mother, with the
month immediately preceding the first month in which no son, daughter, or
legally adopted child of such surviving divorced mother is entitled to a child's
insurance benefit on the basis of the wages and self-employment income of
such deceased individual.
42 U.S.C. S 402{g)(1) (1982).
145. Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. at 295-96. The statute was upheld by a margin of
five to four.
146. Ill. at 294.
147. Ill. at 289.
148. Id. at 295.
149. !d. at 296. Underlying the Justices' dispute over the identity of the intended
beneficiaries is Justice Rehnquist's change of opinion from Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,
420 U.S. 636 (1975) to Califano. In Weinberger, Rehnquist specifically found that the
purpose of section 202{g) was to provide benefits to children. Weinberger, 420 U.S. at 655
(Rehnquist, J., concurring). In Califano, Rehnquist explicitly recanted. Califano, 443 U.S.
at 294-95 n.12.
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relation to the Act's purpose.I 50 Because the discrimination
involved a non marital statute, the dissenters applied the
intermediate equal protection test.l5l The dissenters would have
found that the children could recover under the ActYill In addition,
the dissenters suggested that the majority failed to heed its own
admonition that it is impermissible for the state to penalize the
nonmarital child for conduct and status that the child could not
prevent. I53
The Califano dissent demonstrates that equal protection
challenges by nonmarital children in government benefit cases
are subject to inconsistent applications of equal protection
standards and various interpretations of legislative history. What
accounts for the difference between the majority and minority
in the reading of the statute? Given the Court's willingness to
reject distinctions between marital and nonmarital children in
private finance contexts, the answer may relate to how comfortable
a particular Justice feels in spending public money.
The Court's statutory interpretation was important in deciding
a nonmarital child's entitlement to survivor's benefits under the
Civil Service Retirement Act. In United States v. Clark,I54 the
nonmarital children were denied benefits because, although they
once had lived with a government employee in a family
relationship, they were not living with him at the time of his
death. The Civil Service Act required that a child "live with" a
government employee in order to claim survivor's benefits. The
Civil Service Commission interpreted this term to mean that the
child must live with the employee at the time of the employee's
death. I55 The children argued that the denial of benefits constituted
impermissible discrimination against nonmarital children. The
Court did not reach the equal protection argument because its
interpretation of the statute allowed a decision in favor of the
children. I56 The Court studied the language, intent, and history
of the Civil Service Retirement Act and could find nothing to
150. Califarw, 443 U.S. at 297 -98 (Marshall, J., dissenting!.
151. The dissent cited Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976); Jimenez v. Weinberger,
417 U.S. 628 (1974); and Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) in
support of its application of the intermediate standard. Id. at 302, 304 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
152. Id. at 300.
153. Id. at 303-04.
154. 445 U.S. 23 (1980).
155. United States v. Clark, 445 U.S. at 28.
156. Id. at 27 -28.
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limit the term "live with" to the time of the employee's death. 157
The concurring opinion, while reading the statutory language
regarding "live with" differently than the majority, did not require
the child to live with the employee at the employee's death.
Rather, the concurring Justices believed that "live with" was
Congress' way of requiring a showing of dependency.l58 Justices
Rehnquist and Stewart restricted their dissent to the simple
proposition that the case should have been remanded to the
Court of Claims for an initial consideration of the statutory
claim.l 59
Clark teaches that the Court will side with nonmarital children
when a governmental financial support statute contains no
language or legislative history supportive of an interpretation
which would treat nonmarital and marital children differently.
Even at the risk of obligating the government to expend larger
sums of money, the Court will not differentiate between children
in this situation and will avoid reaching and deciding an equal
protection challenge. 16o
However, in other government benefits cases in which the
statute clearly provides for discrimination between marital and
nonmarital children, the Court will reach the equal protection
question. The problem with the Court's interpretation of the
equal protection standard in these cases has been that the various
members of the Court use incomplete and divergent standards
for determining whether the statute is a violation of equal
protection either on its face or based upon its legislative history.
The various Justices can find support for a particular position
which either supports or opposes the interests of the nonmarital
children. This ad hoc analysis of the cases is troublesome. First,
the analysis makes predicting future determinations in the area
extremely difficult. Second, the reasoning of the Court seems to
be based in part upon the Justices' attitudes toward governmental
expenditures.
157. Id. at 31. Even if the Court had found such a limitation, the majority recognized
that it would then have to deal with an equal protection claim. Statutory construction,
as the Court explicitly noted, is used to avoid constitutional violations by "adopting a
saving statutory construction not at odds with fundamental legislative purposes." Id.
158. Clark, 445 U.S. at 35 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment).
159. !d. at 37 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
160. For equal protection claims in this context, the test is whether the classification
bears a substantial relationship to the interest which the statute is to serve and whether
a classification is substantially related to a permissible state interest. Lalli v. Lalli, 439
U.S. 259, 265, 268 (1978).
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B. Child Support
The Supreme Court also has dealt with the nonmarital child's
interests in financial matters in the context of child support. In
a series of four cases, Gomez v. Perez,16I Mills v. Habluetzel,162
Pickett v. Brown,163 and Clark v. Jeter,164 the Court faced equal
protection challenges based upon claimed discrimination resulting
from the imposition of statutes of limitations against nonmarital
children in child support cases.
In the first case, Gomez, the Court faced the basic question of
whether Texas law allowed marital children a judicially enforceable
right to support from their natural fathers while denying
nonmarital children the same right.165 In a per curiam opinion,
the Court rejected the statutory distinction on equal protection
grounds, finding that "a state may not invidiously discriminate
against illegitimate children by denying them substantial benefits
accorded children generally."166 The Court recognized that Gomez
also raised "lurking problems" regarding the ability to prove
paternity within the statute of limitationsI67 but concluded that
such problems could not create impenetrable barriers to the
enforcement of support by nonmarital children.l68
The statute of limitations issue surfaced several years later in
Mills v. Habluetzel. 169 Mills involved a challenge to a Texas statute
of limitations which required that a suit by a nonmarital child
seeking to identify his natural father be brought before the child
was one year old.170 The state argued that the statute of limitations
protected against stale or fraudulent claims.l7l The Court applied
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

409 U.S. 535 (1973).
456 U.S. 91 (1982).
462 U.S. 1 (1983).
108 S. Ct. 1910 (1988).
Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. at 535.
166. Id. at 538.

167. Id.
168. Id.
169. 456 U.S. 91 (1982). TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. S 13.01 (Vernon 1986) provided: "A suit
to establish the parent-child relationship between a child who is not the legitimate child
of a man and the child's natural father by proof of paternity must be brought before the
child is one year old, or the suit is barred." Id. See also O'Brien, Illegitirruu:y: Suggestion
For Reform Following Mills v. Habluetzel, 15 ST. MARY'S L.J. 79 (1983).
170. Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.s. at 92. In Mills, the mother and the local welfare
department to whom she had assigned the child's support rights brought a paternity
proceeding against the alleged father of her child. Id. at 95-96. The mother lost at trial
because the court imposed the one-year statute of limitations; the child was one year and
seven months old at the commencement of the lawsuit. Id. at 96.
171. Id. at 92.
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its well-established test that in nonmarital situations, a statutory
restriction may survive equal protection scrutiny to the extent
that it is substantially related to a legitimate state interest.172
The Court's analysis involved the two related requirements of
providing the nonmarital child with a sufficient time period within
which to present a claim and establishing an appropriate time
limit which would allow the state to prevent loss of evidence or
avoid fraudulent claims.173 Applying this test, the Court held that
there was a denial of equal protection because the time frame
was unrealistically short given the finality of the result. Although
marital children could seek support at any time until the age of
eighteen, the twelve-month period available to nonmarital children
would make many of these children unable to seek support. The
Court recognized that avoiding fraudulent claims was a legitimate
state interest but found that this interest was not substantial
enough to overcome the child's equal protection claim.174
A two-year statute of limitations for paternity and child support
actions was at issue in Pickett v. Bro'UJ'Yl,.175 In Pickett, the Court
applied Mills and concluded that the two-year period to bring
the action for child support was also insufficient.176 The Court
again recognized that the possibility of fraudulent claims was a
legitimate state interest but noted that scientific advances in
blood testing had reduced further the likelihood of fraudulent
claims.177
Pickett and Mills did not define the period that would suffice
as a statute of limitations in paternity or child support proceedings.
The language in Mills was vague: "The period for asserting the
right to support must be sufficiently long to permit those who
normally have an interest in such children to bring an action on
their behalf despite the difficult personal, family, and financial
circumstances that often surround the birth of a child outside of
172. ld. at 99. By deciding the case on equal protection grounds, the Court did not
reach Mills' due process claim. ld. at 96-97.
173. ld. at 99-100.
174. ld. at 100.
175. 462 U.S. 1 (1983). The Supreme Court had ruled nine years earlier that once a
state sets up a cause of action for child support, it may not deny the same cause of
action to nonmarital children. Gomez v. Perez. 409 U.S. 535 (1973). To do so violates the
equal protection clause. ld. at 537 -38.
'
176. Pickett v. Brown. 462 U.S. at 11-13. As in Milk, the Court did not reach the
due process claim. ld. at 11 n.ll.
177. ld. at 17-18. See also Rivera v. Minnich. 107 S. Ct. 3001. 3008 (1987) (Brennan.
J., dissenting).
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wedlock."178 However, Justice O'Connor's concurring OpInIOn in
Mills suggested that perhaps the statute of limitations should be
similar to other situations in which statutes of limitations are
tolled during minority.179
However, subsequent to Pickett, Congress passed the Child
Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984 and settled the
question of what constitutes a sufficient period of time for
nonmarital children to raise the issue of paternity.lso Section
666(aX5) of that law definitively states that each state must
implement "[p]rocedures which permit the establishment of the
paternity of any child at any time prior to such child's eighteenth
birthday."181
In Clark v. Jeter,182 the Supreme Court avoided the issue of
whether the Child Support Enforcement Amendments were
retroactive when codified by the Pennsylvania legislature. Cherlyn
Clark brought suit in 1983, ten years after the birth of her
nonmarital daughter but prior to the enactment of the Child
Support Enforcement Amendments. The putative father moved
to dismiss, arguing that Pennsylvania's six-year statute of
limitations barred the suit. The mother responded that the statute
of limitations violated the due process and equal protection clauses
of the fourteenth amendment. l83 The trial court upheld Jeter's
argument, and Clark appealed to the superior court of
Pennsylvania.
Before the superior court could rule on the case, the
Pennsylvania legislature enacted an eighteen-year statute of
limitations and brought its law into compliance with the Child
Support Enforcement Amendments; such compliance is required
if a state participates in the federal child support program. l84
Clark asked that the case be remanded to decide the question of
the retroactivity of the new federal statute. On remand, the
Pennsylvania trial court denied Clark's motion for reargument,
holding that the statute was not retroactive absent express

178.
179.
180.
378).
181.
182.
183.
184.

Mills, 456 U.S. at 97.
ld. at 104-05 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984, 98 Stat. 1305 (1984) (Pub. L. 98·

42 U.S.C. S 666(a)(5) (1982 & Supp. ill 1985) (emphasis added).
108 S. Ct. 1910, 1913 (1988).
Clark v. Jeter, 108 S. Ct. at 1913-14.
ld. at 1913.
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legislative intent. 1s5 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
subsequently denied Clark's petition for appeaJ.186
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider
whether Pennsylvania's legislative scheme was discriminatory
because it allowed a nonmarital child only six years to establish
paternity for purposes of obtaining support, while permitting a
marital child to seek support from his parents at any time.
Because Clark's argument in the lower court did not present
adequately the issue of whether the new federal law preempted
the six-year statute of limitations in the lower court, the Supreme
Court avoided the issue of retroactivity and accepted the state's
interpretation. 187
However, the Supreme Court proceeded to decide the case on
the issue of whether the six-year statute of limitations violated
the equal protection clause. The Court relied on its holdings in
Pickett and MiUs, in which the Court struck down one- and twoyear statutes of limitations respectively and held that the period
of time under Pennsylvania law was also too short given the
emotional and financial problems faced by a mother when raising
a nonmarital child. l88 Justice O'Connor, writing for a unanimous
court in Clark, stated that even a six-year statute of limitations
does not provide a reasonable time within which to assert a claim
on behalf of a nonmarital child. In striking down the Pennsylvania
statute as discriminatory, the Court held that "the period for
obtaining support . . . must be sufficiently long [and] any time
limitation placed on that opportunity must be substantially related
to the State's interest in avoiding the litigation of stale or
fraudulent claims."189
As a result of Gomez, Mills, Pickett, and Clark, and most
importantly, Section 666(a)(5) of the Child Support Enforcement
Amendments, the Supreme Court has allowed paternity and
support actions to be brought at any time during the child's first
eighteen years, thus affording a nonmarital child an opportunity
to assert a claim. The Supreme Court has been deferential to
mothers who may not realize fully the financial expenses related
to food, clothing, school, and medical expenses, which increase
185. Clark v. Jeter, 358 Pa. Super. 550, 518 A.2d 276 (1986).
186. Clark v. Jeter, 527 A.2d 533 (1987).
187. Clark v. Jeter, 108 S. Ct. 1910 (1988).
188. ]d. at 1914-15; Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. I, 18 (1983); Mills v. Habluetzel, 456
U.S. 91, 101 (1982).
189. Clark, 108 S. Ct. at 1914.
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substantially as a child develops. This solicitousness seems to be
at odds with the Court's more narrow response when a nonmarital
child seeks to intervene in a probate proceeding or seeks
government support. In those cases, the Court favors the state's
administrative concerns that require filiation proceedings prior
to the putative father's death and finds that federal child support
legislation needs to include nonmarital children explicitly. The
Court's attitude seems, at best, somewhat inconsistent.
CONCLUSION

Several general conclusions can be drawn from the series of
Supreme Court cases involving paternity, adoption, inheritance,
and public and private support benefits.190 In the adoption cases,
a putative father generally cannot prohibit a third party adoption
by withholding consent unless the putative father has complied
with one of the legitimation procedures available under the
particular state statute; this result is subject to the outcome of
a case now pending.I91 It remains unclear whether the father can
nonetheless block an adoption by demonstrating that, based upon
a best interest of the child standard, the child should not be
adopted. It is clear, however, that the absolute rights vested in
a married father do not vest in the putative father unless he has
legitimated the child under the relevant state law. It is unclear
what role a putative father must play in the life of a child born
while the mother was married to and living with another man.
In the context of inheritance by nonmarital children, the Court
has applied the intermediate equal protection test. Under this
test, the Court balances the state's interests against the nonmarital
child's interests. Although the Court firmly rejects states' efforts
to use probate codes to punish the nonmarital child, the Court
will recognize some distinction between nonmarital and marital
children when the interest of the state is in the efficiency of the
probate process. Therefore, a nonmarital child must move
190. For issues involving children of unmarried parents other than the three subjects
discussed in this article. see Little v. Streiter. 452 U.S. 1 (1981). involving the right to
free blood tests for putative fathers in paternity cases; Fiallo v. Bell. 480 U.S. 7fIT (1977).
involving nonmarital children and immigration status; Parham v. Hughes. 441 U.S. 347
(1979). Glona v. American Guar. and Liab. Ins. Co.• 391 U.S. 73 (1968) and Levy v.
Louisiana. 391 U.S. 68 (1968). all involving the interplay of children of unmarried parents
and wrongful death action. See also W. WEYRAUCH & S. KATZ. AMERICAN FAMILY LAW IN
TRANSITION 598-602 (1983).
191. Michael H. v. Gerald D•• 191 Cal. App. 3d 995. 236 Cal. Rptr. 810 (1987).
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expeditiously in asserting a claim to the estate and, more
importantly, in resolving a legitimation or paternity proceeding
prior to the probate matter. How quickly the child must move is
yet to be decided by the Court.
In the area of support benefits, and more particularly in that
of federal funding, the Court has looked at legislative history
and, depending upon the viewpoint of the majority, mayor may
not find a legitimate reason to distinguish between providing
benefits to nonmarital and marital children. The distinctions are
subtle, often emanating from the various Justices' philosophies
of statutory construction and subjective judgments about
legislative history. In fact, the Court may avoid a constitutional
decision altogether by deciding the case solely on the basis of
statutory interpretation. But when the Court has resolved the
constitutional claim, its equal protection analysis has been
simplistic and conclusory. Such treatment makes it extremely
difficult to predict future results.
Finally, there is good news for nonmarital children in the area
of private support claims. The combination of the passage of the
Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984 and the Court's
Cla'rk v. Jeter ruling that the federal law may be applied
retroactively, effectively gives nonmarital children the period
until adulthood to seek support from their natural fathers, thereby
giving them the same protections as marital children. Thus, in
terms of support benefits the results are mixed. As long as
private interests are involved, the nonmarital child will do well.
If, on the other hand, the government is involved, the current
Court is less likely to rule for the nonmarital child. The result
may depend upon whose money the Court is spending.
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